The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–22

Abstract

The use of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921–22 as a possible blueprint for a modern maritime security agreement between China and the United States has been mooted by some Western academics and policy-makers who wish to see some sort of limitation on the growth of naval armaments put in place. This chapter demonstrates the complexity and intricate nature of that former security agreement and discounts the current Sino-American strategic condition as being one which allows for such a comprehensive agreement to be created. More importantly, it focuses not on naval power as the key element around which Anglo-American strategic thinking on the Far East revolved during the conversations that created the eventual treaty outcome, but instead analyse the common views of Chinese race, authority, and legitimacy which led to a shared common approach to attempting stabilise the security environment in the Far East between 1919 and 1922. Based on primary archival research in the United States and Great Britain, the chapter reveals not only the inappropriateness of the Washington Naval Conference process as a useful ‘lessons learned’ for today, but also reveals the true nature of the Anglo-American strategic relationship being one of common commercial and racial appreciations – rather than naval power needs – that made accommodation between the two powers possible.