The Wars in Yugoslavia: Russia and the International Community

Abstract

As YUGOSLAVIA COLLAPSED INTO WAR in 1991-92 Moscow had its problems closer to home and paid relatively little attention to events in the Balkans. Initially, Moscow was prepared to play a largely passive role in support of Western diplomatic efforts, but from 1993 Moscow showed a greater willingness to adopt a more independent pro-Serb line-a development not universally welcomed in the West, particularly as it coincided with the emergence of a virulent strand of nationalism in Russian political life, symbolised by the success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his so-called Liberal Democratic Party in the December elections of that year. As Moscow tilted towards the Serbs, critics argued that Russian policy was encouraging Serb aggression and helping to protect their subsequent territorial gains. Russian opposition to any form of external military intervention was felt to have delayed the end of the war and made a just settlement more difficult to achieve.1 Although Moscow often used vituperative language and occasionally acted in an obstructionist way, the above view is simplistic for two main reasons.