The war will not subside: The Pacific theater in a NATO‐Warsaw Pact war

Abstract

Abstract This paper considers the role of the Pacific theater in a NATO‐Warsaw Pact war. It argues that the Pacific theater has been neglected in such a conflict because most war scenarios envision a struggle lasting no more than 30 to 60 days. As a result, the conflict is over too quickly in most scenarios of the interrelationships between the NATO and Pacific theaters to develop conceptually. However, in a long‐war scenario, the Pacific theater's importance in the course and outcome of such a conflict becomes apparent. The military, industrial, and technological potential of the Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, combined with the U.S., constitute a reserve of strength capable of containing or reversing any Soviet success in a conventional conflict in Europe. This paper concludes that (1) current strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the “first use” of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and (2) the tacit or explicit adoption of a long‐war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.