The War of 1812 Revisited

Abstract

It has been two decades since the last wave of studies of the War of 1812 brought the publication of major books by Bradford Perkins, Reginald Horsman, and Roger Brown.' In view of all that previously had been written on the subject, from Henry Adams to Irving Brant, the assumption that there was not much more to be said about that conflict was widely shared. Now J. C. A. Stagg's Mr. Madison's War makes it abundantly clear that such a conclusion was unwarranted. This ambitious study has much new to say and is so comprehensive, so analytical, and based on such exhaustive research that it promises to be not simply an important addition to an already distinguished literature but the indispensable work on the War of 1812. Some of Stagg's findings and interpretations relating to the causes of the War of 1812 have previously been offered in two articles in the William and Mary Quarterly,2 but his arguments are even more compelling as an integral part of a broader study of the politics, diplomacy, and warfare of the era. While Stagg's probing of the background of the War of 1812 is deep, he dwells only briefly on the years after the war. An epilogue on the years 1815 to 1830 fills out the coverage promised in the subtitle. In treating the coming of the war, Stagg seeks to shift the attention of historians away from Congress, where most historians have seen the decision for war being made even when challenging the role of the War Hawks. Viewing Madison as the key to why and when the decision to resort to war was made, he seeks to explain how Madison, a systematic and analytical thinker, conscious of the relation of means and ends in politics and diplomacy, reached that decision. Stagg puts Canada in the center of Madison's thinking that culminated in his message to Congress in June 1812 asking for a declaration of war. Tracing Madison's ideas and policy positions ir regard to Great Britain from the Peace