Abstract

The ultimate political and strategic consequences of the conflict in Lebanon may already be discerned. On one side, Israel cannot achieve the principal aims it declared at the beginning of the offensive, launched in response to the abduction of its two soldiers by Hizbullah on 12 July. But it can expect Hizbullah to enter a process leading to the dismantling and distancing from the border of a major part of its military capability, so long as Israel is willing to accept mutual concessions. On the other side, Hizbullah is likely to see its major demands met, but at a higher price than it anticipated.

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