The Voluntarism of Duns Scotus, as Seen in His Comparison of the Intellect and the Will

Abstract

THE VOLUNTARISM OF DUNS SCOTUS, AS SEEN IN HIS COMPARISON OF THE INTELLECT AND THE WILL Scotus' voluntarism, appropriately, is a many-splendoured thing; the light from its varying facets radiates on diverse planes in divine and created spheres. Basically its core lies in the divine freedom itself. The light radiating from this absolute liberty touches all other facets of Scotistic voluntarism. And there are many facets indeed in this voluntarism: God's action in regard to all things other than Himself, His creations, actual and possible, His regulation of causality, His determinations of morality; and on the created level, liberty itself, the primacy of love, the primacy of liberty, the possession, excellence and liberty of beatitude, the superiority of the will over the intellect — besides all those things that are uniquely theological, such as the primacy of Christ, the Immaculate Conception, grace and charity, etc. In these days this voluntarism of Scotus in the created sphere has its own pertinence in a world whose culture is turning more and more to the humanist creation of values, to the assertion of the primacy of liberty and to the dignity of the human person. No doubt, Scotus has something to say on all these questions which an existentialist philosophy has beaten to the surface of human consciousness. Of course, one must not exaggerate this pertinence ; for on many and fundamental scores Scotus' philosophy is the very antithesis of existentialism . For example, it could be said that his essentialist metaphysics of being would constitute a classical example of the sort of metaphysics that most existentialists greatly decry. It could even be rightly said that his metaphysics is farther removed from modern existentialist metaphysics than that of St. Thomas himself.1 Medieval scholasticism 1 This can be seen from the fact that his metaphysics is quidditative, whereas St. Thomas' is more existentially slanted; this is particularly true with regard to his proof for the existence of God, where Scotus is at pains to insist that he is not basing the beginning of his proof merely on the contingent fact of some existing effect, but rather on the very nature of being an effect. Cf. Ord. I, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1—2; Ed. Vat. II, p. 151, n. 43, and 64ROBERT PRENTICE, O. F. M. and modern phenomenological existentialism are quite different mentalities .2 But granted these reservations which his metaphysics obliges us to make, we can still admit that there are certain facets of a voluntarism implanted in such a metaphysics that have a modern pertinence. His affirmation of the primacy of the will over the intellect is one of them. Not that we should say that such a facultative division of the human spirit is terribly modern ; but in so far as the assertion of the primacy of the wiU is an affirmation of the primacy of liberty in the human person, we can say that we have here a certain anticipation of the modern humanist and existential preoccupation with the exercise of liberty. However, this is relating Scotus to the things that are ahead of him. To understand his own position, it is more important to relate him to those that were behind him. For, as is well-known, Scotus, in discussing the relations of the intellect and the will, is not doing anything new. That discussion had been standard issue in the schools for half a century ; almost aU of the great lights of scholasticism treated it one way or another — usuaUy in relation to prayer or to beatitude or in some psychological context. When they related it to prayer they commonly asked some sort of question like this: "Whether the inteUect or the will can go higher, when the soul ascends to God in prayer?" This is the sort of question, for example, that Alexander of Hales, Matthew of Aquasparta and Roger Marston all asked.3 It is interesting to note that all three are Franciscan, and in the Augustinian tradition. It is pp. 161—2, n. 56. Professor Gilson has often called attention to this characteristic of Scotistic metaphysics ; cf. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952, pp. 181—182, 185—186, 199...