The 'Void Ab Initio' Theory in Comparative Perspective: J. Marshall, H. Kelsen, and Beyond

Abstract

The void ab initio theory is traditionally associated with the retroactive effect of the unconstitutionality of a statute, in diffused systems of judicial review; as opposed to the prospective effect of unconstitutionality, in Austria, the archetype of centralized judicial review. Nevertheless, both systems tend to converge on the basis of practical considerations. The paper argues that the void ab initio theory goes far beyond the time-factor of judicial review. It is tied to a robust theory of negative liberty; and substantive criminal law is its privileged field of application. The void ab initio theory goes back to Marbury v. Madison (1803). O. Field (The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1935) contrasted this view with the idea of the presumption of constitutionality of the law, and the case to case judicial review. The void ab initio theory was strongly criticized by Kelsen. He argued that a legal act “is not void, it is only voidable”. An unconstitutional act to be annulled “must legally exist, if it can be the object of a judgment by an authority.” Kelsen’s criticism is accurate, when the theory is unduly extended to the unconstitutionality of laws curtailing positive rights of the welfare state, e.g. salaries and pensions, as happened recently in Greece. Indeed, the void ab initio theory in the field of positive social rights encroaches on legislative competence, if it leads to the revival of preexisting legislation.