The Varieties of Realism

Abstract

Abstract The first order of business is to distinguish among several varieties of realism and antirealism. This unexciting but essential preliminary task 1s made all the more tedious by the lack of a standardized nomenclature in the field. Take “instrumentalism”. In the current philosophical literature, this term is often used to refer to a form of antirealism which denies that theoretical statements have truth-values. Almost as often, however, it covers any form of antirealism about theoretical entities. In the first sense of the term, van Fraassen isn’t an instrumentalist; in the second sense, he is. In this chapter, I present a taxonomy of realisms and antirealisms that will (usually) be adhered to throughout this book. Current usage is taken into account as much as possible, but I’ve had to make some arbitrary decisions. I’ve even had to introduce a couple of neologisms. The resulting scheme is adequate for the purpose oflocating the present work in its broader philosophical context. Perhaps it will also encourage terminological standardization among other workers in the field. It shouldn’t be expected that my scheme will be exhaustive of all the forms of realism and antirealism that have occupied the attention of philosophers. Those that I deal with do, however, constitute a set of core positions. They’re the “main sequence” of realist and antirealist views in our era.