Abstract
In this paper I shall discuss some central problems concerning the method of philosophy in D. Z. Phillips' contemplative philosophy of religion. The article focuses on following two interrelated questions: (a) In what sense does Phillips' descriptive philosophy “leave everything as it is?” and (b) How does Phillips understand the relation between personal and philosophical? This paper will discuss some of the principal comments and criticisms linked with these two questions in the recent discussion on Phillips' thought. It is widely thought that Phillips' philosophical accounts of religious beliefs are prescriptive rather than descriptive. I will show that adopting a Wittgensteinian descriptive approach in philosophy of religion does not mean that a philosopher starts from religious believers' own reflections concerning the meaning of their beliefs and practices. Neither does it mean that philosophers simpliciter accept religious practices as they are. In addition, I will try to show that although the contemplative approach in philosophy of religion has a relativistic flavour, there is no reason to connect it with radical relativism or perspectivism. Nevertheless, the distinction between the philosophical and the personal is not clear-cut in Phillips' thought.
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