Abstract
Fix a zero-sum repeated game Γ with incomplete information on both sides. It is known that the value of the infinitely repeated game Γ∞ need not exist (Aumann and Maschler 1995). It is proved that any number between the minmax and the maxmin of Γ∞ is the value of a long finitely repeated game Γn where players’ information about the uncertain number of repetitions n is asymmetric.
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