The value of man in the Hartman value system

Abstract

My esteemed colleague and personal friend Robert S. Hartman has produced and published in The Structure of Value and numerous journal articles what I regard as the most brilliant, creative, and promising scheme of metaethics and formal axiology produced in our century. The explorations of concepts and the logic of normative discourse produced by such thinkers as G. E. Moore, A. J. Ayer, Charles Stevenson, R. M. Hare and so many others are pale in significance by comparison with Hartman's system of formal axiology. It is because I respect it so much that I wish to attack aspects of it in this article, hoping that some more ultimate clarity and adequacy will eventually emerge from the discussion. For present purposes, we shall divide the Hartman scheme into two parts: A) a formal system of axiology in which basic concepts, including the concept of value itself, are defined in formal terms, in which a hierarchy of concepts is propounded, and in which axiological inter-relationships are explored, and so on; and B) suggested application of the formal system. My present difficulties focus primarily around the application of the system which Professor Hartman wishes to sponsor. In its suggested application, the Hartman system yields the following hierarchy of evaluations, based on the principle that Richer in qualities is the definition of better, poorer in qualities is the definition of worse. 1 1) Formal systems and abstractions are of finite value, since they consist of a finite number of properties. Their characteristic number is some finite cardinality. They are exhausted by their defining characteristics. This is the realm of systemic value. 2) Concrete things, i.e. material, sensory, spatio-temporal objects, are better than formal systems since they consist of a greater number of properties. In practice, we normally use only a finite number of properties in evaluating them, but in theory any material object consists of a denumerable infinity of properties, e.g. points if nothing more. Things have a cardinality of Aleph0. This is the realm of extrinsic value. 3) Concrete, individual human persons are better than things, since they consist of a greater number of properties than things. The number of properties constituting a concrete, individual human person is nondenumerably infinite, not merely denumerably infinite. Persons have a minimal cardinality of Aleph1. They are non-denumerably infinite in and in number of properties. This is the realm of intrinsic value. Already, many highly controversial assumptions have been introduced.