Abstract
Abstract This chapter closely examines the free will theodicy and free will defense as responses to arguments from evil for atheism. It sets out three types of accounts of the nature of free will in the contemporary literature on agency and argues that only one of them is suitable for the free will theodicist’s (and defender’s) use. The chapter then takes up the question of whether or not God’s giving created beings free will, as characterized by that suitable sort of account, would make sense—that is, whether or not it would be worth the price. It argues that it would not, or at least that it is not unreasonable to refrain from believing that free will is worth the costs. If free will is not worth the costs, then it is unsuitable to serve as the central good that is alleged to provide a God-justifying reason for allowing evils in the world.
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