Abstract
In the classical model of games with transferable utility one assumes that each subgroup of players can form and cooperate to obtain its value. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not realistic, that is, not all coalitions are feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to raise the whole question of generalizing the concept of transferable utility game, and therefore to introduce new solution concepts. In this paper we define games on matroids and extend theτ-value as a compromise value for these games.
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