The Validity and Electoral Impact of Media Estimations of "Best" or "Worst" State Legislators

Abstract

Many news organizations have ranked or rated state legislators in their state as or most effective and or effective, sometimes using several groups of informants, such as legislators, lobbyists, agency heads, and capital correspondents. Other organizations merely give the impressions of reporters. Obviously those rated worst are displeased with this evaluation and at least somewhat anxious as to what it will mean when they next face an election. This study assesses the validity of these rankings and their impact at the polls. The media rankings cannot be dismissed as invalid, and legislators cannot dismiss their impact at the polls. It helps to be ranked as among the best and it hurts to be among the worst, although the effects are small. Elected officials, the mass media, and the public interact in a very complex manner, of which we have only limited knowledge. We suspect that the availability of expensive media advertisements and the free coverage of incumbents in the media underlie the advantage that legislators have in winning public office. Incumbents overwhelmingly outspend their challengers. Nevertheless there is good reason to believe that the media exaggerates its influence on the electorate and that officials are unduly confident that they can buy elections through the media (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1991, chap. 8). This paper focuses on a limited aspect of potential media influence on politics. Media owners and correspondents tend to see their roles as vital to an informed vote by the electorate. Reports on foibles, corruption, irresponsibility, and unpopular policies might threaten the reelection chances of officials. However, the worldwide pattern of incumbency advantage in seeking reelection limits the media's potential influence in this regard. Between 1968 and 1986, U.S. state legislative incumbents won 91% of the time (Grau 1981; Jewell and Breaux 1988). Obviously, the mass media can have an effect only at the margins, given this high reelection rate. This paper will consider a fairly