Abstract
This study examines how incumbent firms use relational discrimination to manage threats from market entry. The use of relationships to manage market entry implies that incumbent firms decide to collaborate with entering firms instead of incumbent firms based on the extent to which entering firms threaten their own market positions. I argue that incumbent firms seeking collaborators switch between favoring and disfavoring entering firms compared to incumbent firms depending on their social status and brokerage opportunities. A comprehensive dataset on commercial banks' entry into investment banking in the period 1991 to 1997 provides empirical support for my arguments.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
