The Use of Collateral in Gross and Net Payment Systems

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to make a comparative analysis of modern gross and net payment systems, emphasizing the implications of the availability of intraday liquidity in the former, and of collateral requirements in the latter. In contrast to previous models, an economy with two assets is described: eligible as collateral and not eligible, with the aim of being able to determine the implications of the requirement of these guarantees on banks' portfolio decisions—which affects their return—and on the probability and the consequences of a systemic crisis. This allows for comparison of the effects on social welfare of each of the two systems for different sets of parameters that characterize social risk aversion, opportunity set of banks, and the functioning of each settlement model. In a calibration exercise, it is shown how it would be legitimate for a benevolent authority to have a preference for a gross system, like TARGET, over a net system, like EURO1, for relatively high values, although plausible, of risk aversion.