The US Army's Domestic Strategy 1945-1965

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Post-war drawdowns often include a re-negotiation of terms of civil-military relations. After World War II US Army's command culture was marked by an expansive vision of Army's place in American society. This article sketches history of noting its contribution to failing strategies in Vietnam, and argues for greater attention to link between operational concerns and Army's domestic political strategy. ********** To use--and restrain--its immense social, economic, and political influence wisely and effectively, must obviously hold itself in dose rapport with people.--Russell F. Weigley. (1) The United States can boast a distinguished record of innovation during times of war, when rapid technological advances 5 have been matched by innovations in organizational principles of command, and logistics. But military organizational innovation does not end with ceasefire. In tense drawdown periods after war, leaders are tasked with preserving lessons of past wars while preparing for new challenges with shrinking budgets and fewer personnel. The drawdown period is thus a defacto re-negotiation of terms of civil-military relations, and accordingly it is a time when domestic political strategy is especially important. (2) Since we find ourselves yet again in such a moment of re-negotiation, we would do well to consider how earlier attempts to guide Army's post-war relations with state and society shaped organization's readiness when war finally came again. In these moments of re-negotiation, leaders may be inclined to agree with Russell F. Weigley that the must obviously hold itself in close rapport with people. What is not at all obvious is what leaders should do to bring this about. While domestic political strategy, capacity to bring about such changes, is limited by law and custom, there is a growing sense that reality of domestic statecraft should be acknowledged openly in current post-war defense conversation. (3) For example, Charles D. Allen writes of need for senior leaders who are strategic assets capable of ensuring relevance of to nation, a turn of phrase echoed in William G. Braun's recent call for a relevancy narrative to secure Army's fortunes despite public's tendency to under-appreciate its peace-time military. (4) As with any strategy, Army's domestic political strategy bears imprint of underlying attitudes and assumed meanings that form organization's unique culture. Hints of how this is manifested in current drawdown negotiation have been noted by Braun and Allen to revert to a rhetoric dominated by force sizing and prioritization mantra to 'fight and win Nation's wars,' with all other uses of military being 'lesser-included' capabilities. (5) These are not simple calculations, as there are particular challenges associated with changing minds of top commanders on fundamental questions of this sort. (6) However, deeper risk is that, faced with navigating this vast institution through changing operational and political waters, leaders will fall back on bad mental habits and lead to fall ever further out of step with state and American public. What follows is a description of a structure, or set of institutionalized patterns, that arose during post-World War II drawdown and had negative consequences for institution, contributing to an over-long investment in failing strategies employed in Vietnam. (7) This was Army Utopianism, a vision of as a central structure of governance, one that was expected to connect a large proportion of citizens to state and to world. This cultural structure is ultimately a manifestation of a deeper well of civic republican thought in American political tradition, reflecting in part what Samuel P. …