The Untenability of Atomistic Theory of Meaning

Abstract

Atomistic theory of meaning or 'meaning atomism' expresses that each representation either in a linguistic or mental system is completely definable by itself. It explains that meaning of a sentence is determined independently of other sentences, which implies understanding a sentence does not require any further sentences for its support because, each sentence conveys a specific sense, and it is about the state of affairs of the world. Thus, 'sense' assists to identify the referent of a sentence. A sentence is meaningful if the state of affairs is found in the phenomenal world, and if it does not find in the phenomenal world, then it is judged as meaningless sentence. Meaning of a sentence is thus determined by its truth-value that stands as referent of the sentence. In this context, the paper argues how meaning atomism is inadequate to capture the whole complexity of meaning in the language system. Further, it highlights the logical problems in atomistic theory of meaning for not being qualified as a comprehensive theory of meaning. In this regard, we have considered some of the well-known traditional theories of meaning, such as; picture theory of meaning, verifiability theory of meaning, Tarski's T-Schema, Frege's notion of sense determination of propositions among others, and offer a few crucial arguments on the failure of atomistic theory of meaning in a language system.