‘The Unnecessary War’? Military Advice and Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1931-1939

Abstract

The policy proved abortive, and Chamberlain quickly recognised the fact; the interest of his proposals in this context lies in the clear recognition of Germany as the main enemy, and the determination to enforce some priorities as the only alternative to a helpless drift in defence and foreign policy alike. The guarantee to Poland, offered in the mistaken belief that a German attack on that country might be imminent, did not derive from any compelling military reason, though equally it was not given against military advice. Nothing in the military advice would have led ministers to imagine that Russia was capable of mounting a successful offensive outside her own borders, though it was generally accepted, and had been for some time, that the Red Army would fight doughtily in defence of Russian soil. This chapter has dealt, often in a cursory way, with some aspects of British diplomacy and strategy in the ten years before the Second World War.