Abstract
Toward the end of the twentieth century, ownership of corporate equity in the United States and Great Britain has once again become relatively concentrated, but this time in the hands of institutional owners such as pension funds and mutual funds. An important implication of this concentration is that ownership has become professional and, because these institutions are fiduciary institutions, subject to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. Furthermore, because of an institution's size or because of an explicitly policy of indexing, many institutions have become “universal owners”. A universal owner owns a small, but representative fraction of most of the companies in an economy. Thus, its ability to satisfy its fiduciary duties depends heavily on overall macroeconomic efficiency and performance rather than on the performance of any particular firm that it might own. Consequently, universal owners have a natural interest in issues of sustainable development because they receive the benefits from positive externalities generated by portfolio firms and are likewise harmed by their negative externalities.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.