Abstract
Abstract NBAR the end of Nicomachean Ethics 6, Aristotle makes the surprising claim that the virtues do not exist independently of each other (1144b32–1145a2). A person with one moral virtue must possess all others. The reason is that practical wisdom (ϕρóνησις) is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral virtue: ‘it is impossible to be properly [κνρíως] good without practical wisdom, or to be practically wise without [also having) moral virtue’ (1144b30–2). In order to have any one moral virtue, a person needs the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (because virtue is just a capacity to act with practical wisdom, or ‘right reason’— òρθòς λóγoς —1144b26-8), and anyone with practical wisdom will have all the virtues (1145a1–2).
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