The Unity of Dependence

Jack Casey

doi:10.1017/apa.2021.5

Abstract

AbstractMost philosophers treat ontological dependence and metaphysical dependence as distinct relations. A number of key differences between the two relations are usually cited in support of this claim: ontological dependence's unique connection to existence, differing respective connections to metaphysical necessitation, and a divergence in their formal features. Alongside reshaping some of the examples used to maintain the distinction between the two, I argue that the additional resources offered by the increased attention the notion of grounding has received in recent years potentially offer us a way to unite the two relations, promising the attendant benefits parsimony offers, as a result.

Highlights

Ontological dependence is usually characterized as being the relation at issue when something depends for its existence on the existence of another entity
The position I take is that all instances of ontological dependence are a subset of grounding instances, and what marks an instance of grounding as an instance of ontological dependence is that it is an instance in which something’s existence is that which is grounded
I have here only contrasted an account of ontological dependence in terms of grounding with an account of ontological dependence in modal existential terms

Summary

Introduction

Ontological dependence is usually characterized as being the relation at issue when something depends for its existence on the existence of another entity. It seems correct to say that {Pegasus} does not depend on Pegasus in the actual world, given that neither exist, though according to the definition of rigid ontological dependence as stated above, this relation of dependence does hold in the actual world. The argument that the modal existential analysis of ontological dependence should be avoided because it entails that relations hold between non-existents—such as {Pegasus} and Pegasus—fails.

Results

Conclusion