The United States and the German Question

Abstract

Translated by Richard Sharp Washington and Bonn both believed until the late 1950s that the German question could be resolved only by the German people exercising their right to self-determination through free elections and that only then would conditions for European detente exist. During the 1960s, however, the views of the two governments increasingly diverged. The fact that the Federal Republic of Germany was acting to some extent as a “gatekeeper” obstructed American work for detente because the German insistence on the primacy of reunification ran counter to Washington's demand for at least temporary recognition of the status quo in Europe. In a complex process of bilateral readjustment, it became evident to the governments in Washington and Bonn that European detente was the top priority. As a result, the German question ceased to be so acute. By the early 1970s, the overall situation surrounding detente policy had undergone surprising changes: The treaty sought with the East by the West German government under Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel clearly went too far for Richard Nixon's administration. The Nixon government stopped short of open criticism but, behind closed doors, expressed fears that the new Ostpolitik being pursued by the Federal Republic was too accommodating toward the Soviet Union. As a result, Washington initially greeted Bonn's renewed initiatives in the field of detente policy with suspicion. THE ATTITUDE OF THE NIXON AND FORD ADMINISTRATIONS TOWARD THE GERMAN QUESTION The Nixon Administration initially harbored grave reservations about what Brandt called Ostpolitik. With each German state seeking to seduce the other, they might finally come together on some nationalist, neutral program, as Adenauer and de Gaulle had feared. . . . Above all, the Nixon Administration feared for the unity of the West . . . Washington viewed the specter of West Germany breaking out on its own with trepidation.