Abstract
AbstractThis paper aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the claim of eliminative materialism (EM), espoused by Paul and Patricia Churchland. It will identify and clarify alternative understandings of that view and assess the version that is the most plausible interpretation in the light of the Churchlands' writings and contemporary discussions. The result of the analysis is that eliminativism is best understood as a methodological thesis regarding the scope and depth of the possible revision of (scientific and folk) usage of FP terms and principles. The problem is important not only, and nor primarily, for exegetical purposes. EM functions in contemporary metaphysics of mind mainly as a point of negative reference: for this reason, it is important to carefully formulate the main claim of EM so that the theorists taking part in the debate know what they actually disagree with. The careful formulation provided by this paper could show other philosophers that their position is not, in fact, as far from EM as they might have thought.
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