The Unique World of the Timaeus

Abstract

The Unique World of the Timaeus RICHARD D. PARRY AT 30cl TO 31b3 or TI~E Timaeus, Timaeus introduces the Model Form that the Demiurge will use in making the world and argues that the Model and the world copied after it will be unique.' There has been misunderstanding of this passage from many sides. In this paper I will begin by reviewing one of the recent interpretations, made by David Keyt, and then by giving the interpretation I believe to be the correct one. A number of consequences of this interpretation will then be drawn that effect F. M. Cornford's commentary on this point and H. Cherniss's reading of this argument. I. In an article entitled "The Mad Craftsman of the Timaeus" David Keyt says that the argument at 31a2-5 commits the craftsman's version of the fallacy of division ." When someone is making, for example, a table from directions, if he made the table out of paper because the directions are on paper, he would be committing this fallacy. Just so, while the aim of Plato's argument is to show that our world is unique, according to Keyt, Plato tries to prove this claim by appealing to the uniqueness of the Form on which the Demiurge fashions our world. But uniqueness is a property that belongs to the Form because it is a Form, not because it is a paradigm. The fallacy here is in attributing to the copy a property that belongs to the Form qua Form; such a property is called by Keyt a formal property.3 He illustrates the fallacy: Plato's argument is this: the cosmos was made according to its model; its model is unique; therefore, the cosmos is unique. If Plato accepts this argument, he should also be prepared to accept the following one, which within his system has true premises and a false conclusion: the planet Mercury was made according to its model (the Form of heavenly god); its model is unique; therefore, Mercury is the only heavenly god (that is, the only celestial body).' Before we can assess Keyt's criticism we must analyze the argument whereby Plato arrives at the uniqueness of the Model Form. This is relevant for it will allow us to see the kind of uniqueness the Model Form has. When we come to see the kind of uniqueness this Form has, we will see that it is not, as Keyt charged, a formal property of the Form at all. In fact, we shall see that the uniqueness of the Form is not a 1 would like to express my gratitude to Professor David T. Furley, who discussed this paper with me and made a number of helpful suggestions. ' Internal references to the Timaeus and the Gorgias in this paper are taken from volumes 3 and 4 of Platonis Opera, J. Burnet, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902). 2Philosophical Review 80 (1971):230-35. ' Ibid., p. 230. ' Ibid., pp. 232-33. A similar point is made by I. M. Crombie in An Examination of Plato's Philosophical Doctrines, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 2:200. Keyt goes on to argue that Plato is guilty of the same kind of fallacy in two other places in the Timaeus; in this paper I shall concentrate on this argument at 31a2. [l] 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY formal but a material property; that is, it is a property the Form has, not because it is a Form, but because of the kind of Form it is. Anyone reading Keyt's article would fail to see this important feature of the argument for the uniqueness of the Form because the article does not include this portion of the overall argument for the uniqueness of our world. !1. In fact, the bulk of the argument at 31a-b is devoted to the Form called (in the Cornford translation used in this paper) the Living Creature. The aim of the argument is to prove that this Form has a unique property in virtue of the kind of Form it is.' Once Plato has established the unique property of the Form he will be able to argue that whatever is...