The Union Shop Authorization Referendum

Abstract

The trade union may be thought of as an organizational entity with an existence separate and apart from the members who give it life. From a legal point of view, federal legislation has recognized the union as a sufficient entity which can sue or be sued in a court of law; sociologically, the union may be thought of as an institution with its own survival requirements, one of which is to command the loyalty of its members who may regard the maintenance of the organized groups as an end in and of itself. The basic purpose of the union, however, is to act as a collective bargaining agent in determining wages and working conditions under which each individual worker performs his daily tasks. The union, therefore, must also be a political government where constituents elect representatives to act for them in the name of the organization. As with any other type of representative government, union officials may be responsive to the will of the group, or they may be dishonest, venal and interested only in their own advancement, or alternatively, their concern may be primarily with the institution of the union itself, at their own or the members' expense. All three interests may, of course, coincide and a particular course of action might be beneficial to membership, satisfy the ego-drives of the leadership, and forward the cause of the union. It is not difficult, however, to construct circumstances where the interests of workers, officials and the institution of the union diverge. Increasingly in recent years, interest has grown in the union's role as collective bargaining agent and questions have been raised about whether union officials have been placing personal or institutional interests above those of the membership. Specifically, inquiries have been raised about strikes in both the SmithConnally' and Taft-Hartley Acts.2 The war-time Smith-Connally Act provided for a thirty-day cooling-off period at the end of which time workers were asked to vote on whether or not they wished to authorize a walk-out. Under the TaftHartley Act, the President is authorized to seek an eighty-day injunction to postpone a strike which would tend to imperil national health or safety.3 While the injunction is in effect, employees vote on whether to accept the employer's last offer. A negative vote allows the union to pursue the strike at the end of the injunction's term. In early 1954, President Eisenhower asked Congress to extend strike authorization votes to all industries covered by the federal statute.4 He spoke of the im-