Abstract
Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.
Highlights
According to a common-sense platitude, identity is what matters in survival
The Strong Reading of the Platitude Person P1 has at t1 reasons for prudential concern for the well-being of person P2 at t2 if and only if P1 is identical with P2
A second, weaker reading focuses on one’s relation, more generally, to a future time: The Weak Reading of the Platitude Person P1 has at t1 reasons for prudential concern for some person’s wellbeing at t2 if and only if P1 is identical with some person who is alive at t2
Summary
According to a common-sense platitude, identity is what matters in survival. To say that a relation is what matters in survival is to say that it is in virtue of that relation one has reasons for prudential concern for whether one’s survival will be good or bad.1 The platitude can be given at least two readings. The Strong Reading of the Platitude Person P1 has at t1 reasons for prudential concern for the well-being of person P2 at t2 if and only if P1 is identical with P2.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
