Abstract
We analyze the impact of doping regulations on the doping decisions of athletes in a Tullock contest. We show that stricter anti-doping regulations may increase the profits of doped athletes, which makes doping more sustainable in the long run. Under certain conditions, a naturally more able athlete may receive a lower payoff than his naturally less able competitor, reversing the natural payoff order. We consider the case of different anti-doping agencies and show that harmonization of doping regulations may increase the doping intensity. We point out incentive problems that may arise in the case of strategic interaction between anti-doping agencies.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
