The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds by Mark s> Cornwall (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 541 The author hopes that his book will counter the belief that there was a Russianoppressionin Finland,based on militaryconsiderations.Certainlyhis research suggests that oppression is quite the wrong term for the Russian presence, and that militarymen were not able to get their way as easily as in other parts of the Russian Empire. The Finns could be trickycustomers, as Nicholas I and Stalinwell understood. CentreforRussianandEast EuropeanStudies J. N. WESTWOOD University ofBinningham Cornwall, Mark. The Undermining ofAustria-Hungaiy. TheBattle for Heartsand Minds.Macmillan, Basingstokeand London, and St Martin'sPress,New York, 2000. xiv + 485 pp. Notes. Tables. Bibliographical references. Index. ?50.00. THIS study of I9I4-I9I8 war propaganda is, on the one hand a model of thorough and solid research,and on the other, a model of cautious, measured judgement about the resultsof that research.Measuredjudgement about war propaganda, and especially about its effects is essential to any serious study; the whole subject, as the author reminds us again and again, has been confusedby the excessiveclaimswhich thepractitionersand advocatesof such propagandahave consistentlymade about its results.He is at pains to correct and limit such claims, such as the 'modest claim' of Wickham Steed, never a modest man, in i9I8 that the propaganda he and others had conducted considerablyacceleratedthe dissolutionof the HabsburgMonarchy (p. 443). This book concentrates on a special kind of war propaganda, front propaganda addressedby one side to the soldiers of the enemy. The book is conceived on thelargestscale, assistedby aremarkablecommand of languages and of archival and printed material. Mark Cornwall examines such propaganda on a number of frontsin I914- I9I8, including some which may well be unfamiliareven to specialists.Thus, successive chapters consider the frontpropaganda which Vienna addressedto enemy soldierson the Russian and Serbian fronts, and then similar propaganda by Vienna on the Italian front;which is followed by a large section on the Italianlarge-scalecampaign addressedto the polyglot Austrian army on that front. To this campaign the Britishmade a serious contributionbut the author insiststhat it remained an essentiallyItalianenterprise.This partof the book contains much worthwhile detail about the activities of Benes in Italy and also about the unspeakable conditions in which the soldiersof the Austrianarmy had to live and fight by I9I8. One Polishcorporalcomplained thathis rationswould hardlyfeed a cat (P. 282). In spite of everythingthe Austrianarmyremained an armyand held the Italianfront to the end of the Monarchy. There was never such a massive mutiny as that of the Frencharmyin I9I7 which endangeredthe whole Allied front in France, let alone the conduct of the Russian army at the very same time which ceased to be a combatant force;neitherof these developmentscan be explained by enemy propaganda. The authors of specialized studies such as this often fall into the trap of claiming far too much for their material. Dr Cornwall avoids this trap and 542 SEER, 79, 3, 200 I maintains a proper perspectivethroughout so that he places his special study in itscorrectcontext. He neverclaimsthatfrontpropagandahad considerable results.Warsarenot won bypropagandabut by the balanceof powerbetween the belligerents. One could well argue that in such a prolonged war as 19I4-1 9I8 the diplomacy which brought in more and more belligerentson the Entente side was of far greater importance than any propaganda. The other context which the author keeps in mind is the political and military weaknessof the Monarchy and the causes and course of its dissolution.These causes have been so much debated since I9I8 and have so often been obfuscated that the author's formulation, clear and precise, is well worth quoting in full: 'The "primary reason" was internal. During the war the Austro-Hungarian authorities lost the battle for hearts and minds to those who believed in new statesand formsof government.Not only did the Empire fail to propagate its own raison d'etre sufficiently.Even if it had done so, the evidence suggeststhatitsown propagandawouldhave been whollyinadequate and ill-matchedto deal with the many unresolvedpolitical and nationalissues from the pre-war period. These issues festered increasingly during he war, exacerbatedby warwearinessand the criticalfood situation.They formedthe essentialdomesticbasiswhich enabled outside forces,the "secondaryreason" to contributeto the Monarchy'sdissolution [. . .] these outside influenceshad the effectof spurringon domestic nationalistsso thatthey made crucialmoves away from the Empire at an opportune moment, when...