The unconditional ‘ought’: A theoretical model for the anthropology of morality

Abstract

Despite growing interest in the study of morality in anthropology, the field continues to be hindered by the lack of a common theoretical framework that adequately conceptualizes morality as an analytic concept and distinguishes it from other domains of social judgment. Drawing upon and critiquing efforts by Laidlaw and Zigon, I propose a theoretical model that recognizes morality as one of three kinds of ‘ought’ propositions. As a special kind of ‘ought’, moral judgment and practice imply prescriptive standards that are experienced as factual and unconditional, independent of prudence or consensus. The distinction between moral discourse and ‘embodied’ morality, as well as the relationship between morality and ontological categories such as personhood and self, are discussed in light of this understanding. The essay concludes with a brief analysis of moral discourse among members of organized atheist groups.