The Uncertain Path of Empirical Reasoning, Part I: the Unfolding of Hume’s Critique of the Argument from Design

Abstract

In the previous chapter we have examined, among other matters, Hume’s negative opinion about the attitude of common people (the vulgar) who appeal to extraordinary experience to justify the truth of their religious beliefs. In the present chapter we shall dwell instead on the philosophical calling, namely, the appeal of the reasonable or sensible person (the wise) to ordinary experience. Indeed, the analysis of Hume’s critique of the argument from design will be the principal task of Part III of this book. It might appear to be a contradiction in terms, but I shall try to trace a sort of logical history of this critique. Hume’s thorough analysis of the argument in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is the last stage in the development of a theoretical position that has its roots in the Treatise of Human Nature, is succinctly outlined in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (especially in Section XI), obliquely suggested but cautiously toned down in the Natural History of Religion, and finally unfolded in all its ramifications in the Dialogues. Yet the purpose of this journey is not only to clarify Hume’s diagnosis of the logical fitness of this particular argument, but to determine what his final position concerning the supposed rational foundation of religion really is. In the next section we shall deal with the first inklings of the critique in the Treatise.