The UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy: An Effective Mechanism against Complicity of Peacekeeping Forces?

Abstract

In early 2013, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General has formulated a UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, which has already been taken up by the Security Council in the context of mandates for UN peacekeeping forces. The new policy aims at preventing UN support to state and non-state actors alike used for the commission of grave violations of international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law. This contribution argues that this policy can be seen as a faithful implementation of existing legal obligations of the UN, in particular in the light of the rules on complicity in the law of international responsibility. Its potential for innovation lies in its procedural mechanism which requires a balancing on the part of UN entities whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of the law. In this respect, the policy goes beyond what international law would require of the UN. A particular challenge, however, lies in the implementation of the policy, especially in highly volatile situations such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In such situations, a delicate balance needs to be struck between the requirement not to contribute to violations of international law and the need to implement the goals of the mission, which often requires cooperation with non-UN forces on the ground.