Abstract
The Dangerous Dogs Act (DDA) is considered among the most controversial pieces of legislation ever passed in the UK. Its effectiveness and how it works in practice, up until a dog and its owner are charged, has been subjected to considerable analysis. However, there has been little examination of how the DDA works after charging, nor of how courts are interpreting it. We accessed legal cases from 1992 to 2019, the period in which the DDA has been in force. Each case was examined from a legal and ethical perspective, using doctrinal legal methodology and the principlism approach to ethics described by Beauchamp and Childress. Analysis showed that while improvements to the function of the act have been made, substantial legal and ethical failings remain, particularly with Section 1 and the therein breed specific legislation (BSL). Legal failings could be partially resolved by removing the reversed burden of proof placed on dog owners and allowing a change of ownership for banned breeds. However, ethical failings could only be resolved through the abolition of BSL. Further study into whether judicial bias exists against certain breeds found to be dangerously out of control is warranted.
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