The U.K. Offshore Operators' Response to the Piper Alpha Disaster

Abstract

Summary This paper describes the U.K. government's inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster and examines one organization's response to recommendations from that inquiry. Introduction Immediately after the July 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, U.K. offshore operating companies reviewed their "software" procedures, such as permits to work, and initiated "hardware" changes based on lessons learned from the disaster. These included provision for and siting of emergency shutdown valves, subsea isolation systems, prevention of smoke ingress to accommodations, provision for better marking and screening of emergency walkways, and improved firefighting systems. The government inquiry into Piper Alpha, headed by Lord Cullen, was given two tasks: to determine the cause of the disaster and to recommend how similar disasters could be prevented. The U.K. Offshore Operators Assn. Ltd. (UKOOA) contributed to the second task by providing the majority of expert witnesses. Lord Cullen's report recommended sweeping changes to the U.K. regulatory regime and listed 106 specific recommendations for consideration by government and industry. UKOOA immediately endorsed the recommendations, is monitoring their implementation, and is coordinating the industry studies needed to support a number of them. Background UKOOA represents the 36 oil and gas companies designated operators of licenses on the U.K. continental shelf. Its main objectives are to provide an industry forum for discussion of matters of mutual interest to its members and, as appropriate, to provide the industry with a means of communication with the U.K. government and other relevant bodies. Its strength lies in the work of its committees. Volunteers from UKOOA's member companies comprise the 40 permanent committees and subcommittees. The Piper Alpha disaster shocked the industry and the general public. In the aftermath of the personal tragedies came the inevitable self-examination and uncertainty. The designs and operating procedures, which for so long had been considered dependable and safe, now looked vulnerable. What had gone wrong? What could be done to prevent a similar accident?