The Two Souls

Abstract

In this contribution I will inquire into the understanding of ‘soul’ (Seele) that Hegel lays out in his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and Philosophy of Nature. What are we to make of the fact that – as Bernard Bourgeois pointed out – Hegel treats the notion of Seele twice within his system, first to characterize animal subjectivity and then human subjectivity? Does this mean that ‘soul’ is for Hegel an independent layer of our cognitive anatomy that we share with animals? I will argue that by analyzing this doubleness we can, indeed, deeper our understanding of Hegel’s understanding of human cognition. Nevertheless, I shall also contend that the philosopher did not believe that humans and animals were ensouled in the same way. To argue for my claim, I will proceed in the following way: first, I will survey Hegel’s definition of ‘soul’ and its main features. Second, I will focus on Hegel’s methodological remarks at the beginning of his Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, especially on Hegel’s use of the notion of ‘anticipation’ (Antizipation). Third, I will dwell on the notion of ‘sensation’ and its role in Hegel’s theory of human cognition. My aim is to show that soul and sensation, in the human case, cannot be conceived of in terms of a separable layer of mental anatomy but are always already informed by higher faculties.