Abstract
AbstractThis article examines the impact of two policy crises on the structure and behaviour of Canadian oil and gas interest groups. It first retests Glyn Berry's three propositions developed in 1974 after the first energy crisis, in light of the second energy crisis in 1979–1980. It then generates and examines two further propositions. The three propositions retested are: that interest group influence declines during a crisis; that if the crisis necessitates intensive federal-provincial bargaining, this tendency is accentuated, and that when facing a serious governmental threat the group under attack will seek to exert its influence as widely as possible. The article shows that the evidence from the second crisis supports the validity of the above propositions, but in addition two further hypotheses are examined and found valid. These are: that in post-crisis periods interest group influence is re-established, but that where crises broaden the scope of policy, interest groups are restructured so as to accommodate the broadened interests which both benefit from and are harmed by the crisis policy response. The interest groups examined are the Canadian Petroleum Association, the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors, and the Canadian Gas Association.
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