The Two Chief Epistemic Styles of Mathematical Ecology

Abstract

AbstractIn this chapter, I deal with the disciplinary speciation of mathematical ecology in the light of the neo-Kantian thesis according to which modern science ensued from the process of mathematization of nature. The issue of a historical epistemology of mathematical ecology finds a suitable place in this context, that is to say, in what I call “the two chief epistemic styles of mathematical ecology”, the “Galilean style” and the “fictional style”. The first one – the “Galilean style” – finds exemplification in astronomy studies and considers nature as an expression of rationality. The Galilean style works on the assumption that the laws of nature can be discovered and expressed in the language of mathematics. Differently, the “fictional style” takes mathematical representations as “fictions” aimed to adjust the empirical basis to a scientific theory. Its distinctive feature lies in assuming an ontological distance between the natural object and its mathematical representation. My main claim is that the historical oscillation between both chief epistemic styles proves the epistemological historicity of mathematical ecology.