Abstract

This article examines the factors that account for the Armed Forces of the Philippines's (AFP) never-ending involvement in many wars of the third kind. It discusses the essence of counter-insurgency warfare or low-intensity conflict in the Philippine setting. The article then notes that the disruption in the US military assistance after 1992, the AFP's inability to modernize, and its continuous campaign against communist and secessionist insurgents have adversely affected its structure and overall combat efficiency. It also analyzes the impact of the global war on terror on the Philippine military's counter-insurgency operations and the reforms undertaken by the Philippine defense establishment to address these issues. In conclusion, the article argues that reforms will not lead to a significant transformation of the AFP as it will continue to be an orphan of counter-insurgency in the near future. However, if wars of the third kind will persist, this situation will paradoxically make the AFP the only military in Southeast Asia aptly geared for the long war of this century.

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