The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes In a widely read book, Mümtaz Soysal identifies a similar dynamic (sarkaç) between poles of ‘freedom’ and ‘authoritarianism’. He sees the ups and downs of the constitutional movements in Turkish history as indications of his proposed pendulum. M. Soysal, 100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı [Meaning of Constitution in 100 Questions], 9th edn. (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1992). Other works have looked at a similar problematic relationship between stability and democracy, see İlter Turan, ‘Stability versus Democracy: The Dilemma of Turkish Politics’, Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi , Vol.2 (1991), pp.31–53, or at a division in the Turkish state structure as a way of dealing with this problematic split, see Kemal Karpat, ‘Military Intervention in Turkey: Army–Civilian Relations before and after 1980’, cited in İlter Turan, ‘Stability versus Democracy’; Heath Lowry, ‘Betwixt and Between: Turkey's Political Structure on the Cusp of the 21st Century’, in Morton Abramovitz (ed.), Turkey's Transformation and American Policy (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000). While useful, these works have often considered stability from the perspective of political security, rather than national, and have not conceptualized the dichotomy in a systematic manner that would permit an understanding of, for example, its causes or justifications. Moreover, while recent works by this author have investigated modern implications of the dichotomy, including its effects on how Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish issue (Ersel Aydınlı, ‘Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's Political Struggle with the PKK’, Security Dialogue, Vol.33 (2002), pp.209–25.) and how it can be seen as being behind the divide in Turkish politics over the issue of EU accession (Ersel Aydınlı and Dov Waxman, ‘A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey's Entry into the European Union’, Current History, Vol.100 (2001), pp.381–8.), no works have extensively explored the relationship in historical terms. For a detailed discussion see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990). Mahmut II was one of the first to introduce measures aimed at restoring a more centralized power than the more ‘dangerous’ looking federal/confederal one. Since the primary goal was to renew the state structure, the agents of this mission were the Ottoman intellectuals who had been highly associated with the state structure. These same intellectuals were identified by Şerif Mardin as being the bureaucrats. Şerif Mardin, ‘Tanzimat ve Aydınlar’ [‘Tanzimat and Intellectuals’], in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi [Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985). Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839–1950 [The History of Turkey's Democracy 1839–1950] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999). Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma [Modernization in Turkey] (Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), pp.128–32. Bülent Tanör, Osmanlı–Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri [Ottoman–Turkish Constitutional Developments] (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), pp.75–95. The first section said basically that the Ottoman state had been very successful and powerful because it obeyed and conducted Islamic Law, and the second section says that the Ottoman state was in decline and poverty because it had become less obedient to Islamic Law. The third section follows with the argument that if correct measures are taken in the state administration, the Ottoman state, with its strong geographical position, fertile lands, and skilful people, would develop in 5–10 years' time. The fourth section lists the principles upon which the new laws would depend, and the final section prescribes the necessary steps to be taken in order to reach the desired outcomes. Several authors have analysed the above items. See for example, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.1: Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1808 (Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sina Akşin (ed.), Osmanlı Devleti 1600–1908 [The Ottoman State 1600–1908] (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1993), and Fahir H. Armaoğlu, 19.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1789–1914 [19th Century Political History] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997). Sina Akşin even argues that Mustafa Reşit Pasha, by introducing the principle of safety for lives and properties, was trying to save his own and his peers' lives and wealth. Akşin, Osmanlı Devleti, p.121. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p.60. Oral Sander, Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme [The Rise and Fall of the Phoenix: A Study on the Ottoman Diplomatic History] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1987), pp.125–31. Bernard Lewis, Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu [The Emergence of Modern Turkey], tr. Metin Kıratlı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984), p.107. Akşin, Osmanlı Devleti, p.122. Ibid., p.130. Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.114. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.21. Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.118. Ibid., p.118 Armaoğlu, 19.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, p.223. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.24. Ibid., p.24. Cited in Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.25. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.25. Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.151. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.26. This name was intended as a Turkish translation of ‘Jeune Turquie’, which was used by one of the movement members, Prens Mustafa Fazıl, in a letter he wrote to the Sultan from Paris. Fazıl was inspired by the popular terminology in use in Europe, such as Young Italia, Young Germany, Young France, etc. Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.152–3. This letter not only coined the term ‘New Ottomans’ but also formed the basis of the programme of this society. Its content was strikingly liberal in the sense that it posited freedom as the foundation of all progress. In the same vein, the letter upheld freedom of conscience as well as secular administration and public accountability. More radically, it argued that for every country the legitimate way of governance was a constitutional arrangement. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi, pp.27–8. Akşin, Osmanlı Devleti, pp.141–2. Quoted in Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi, p.27. For example, by 1867, Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey, Ali Süavi, Reşat Bey, Nuri Bey, Agah Efendi, Mehmet Bey, Rifat Bey, and Hüseyin Vasfi Paşa, had all escaped to Paris. Şinasi was there from 1865 onwards. Ibid., p.28. One of these foreigners was Slodyslaw Plater, a Polish nationalist and a bourgeois revolutionary. The other was Simon Deutsch of Vienna. Ibid., p.29. Şerif Mardin addresses a different aspect of the change in the thinking of the Young Ottomans in this era. As he points out, the Young Ottomans also agreed that one of the major shortcomings of the Tanzimat period was that an overarching philosophy – namely, the enlightenment philosophy in the west – was seen as the primary driving force behind western parliamentarism and constitutionalism. To them, Tanzimat dismissed Islam's world view as a potential overarching philosophical perspective, and this led to a groundless and weak construction of liberal reforms. Instead, they proposed, Islamic principles could provide a philosophical platform for a democratic system. Şerif Mardin, Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler IV [Turkish Modernization: Articles IV] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), pp.185–6. Erik Jan Zürcher, Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık [Unionism in the National Struggle], trans. N. Salihoğlu (Istanbul: Bağlam, 1987), p.21. Tensions in European and Ottoman relations were further heightened after the 1876 killing of German and French Consul Generals by crowds in Salonika. Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.158. Shaw also reports that the divinity student rebellion was provoked and designed by a liberal bureaucratic group led by Mithat Pasa. Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp.162–3. Ibid., pp.163–6. Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma. Thus the west would be defeated by its own weapons (westernization). Aykut Kansu, ‘20. Yüzyıl Başı Türk Düşünce Hayatında Liberalizm’ [‘Liberalism in Early 20th Century Turkish Thought’], in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce [Political Thought in Modern Turkey], Vol.1, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001). Cited in Lewis, Modern Türkiye, p.153. Armaoğlu, 19.Yüzyıl Siyasi, p.222. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.37. Rumeli referred at the time to the European side of the Ottoman Empire. Tanör, Osmanlı–Türk, pp.128–29. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.39. Heyet–i Mebusan, which can be compared to the House of Commons in a bicameral system, could propose laws only in areas falling within its jurisdiction, and these areas were not clearly defined in the 1876 constitution. When this assembly drafted a law, it was supposed to be approved first by the upper chamber of the parliament and then by the Sultan. Rejection by either of these two meant that the law would be abandoned. Tanör, Osmanlı–Türk, pp.141–44. These rights included, first and foremost, the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law. Arbitrary punishment outside the rule of law was prohibited. In addition to the security of life, the security of property principle was adopted within the new constitution. No longer could property be confiscated by the state unless it was compensated or confiscation was legally justified. Likewise, the taxation system would be rearranged on a more just basis to include all Ottoman subjects. Ibid., pp.145–7. Articles 109 and 110 were included at the insistence of Prime Minister Mithat Pasha, because of his governorship experience. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, p.178. Unlike its predecessor in 1876, the new constitution protected individuals not only from arbitrary punishment but also from arbitrary arrest. The infamous Article 113 of the previous constitution, which subjected all rights and liberties to the Sultan's will, was excluded from the new constitution. It still did not allow full freedom of thought, but introduced certain measures on the way to freedom of the press. In addition, freedom of association was institutionalized with the new constitution, though in a limited fashion. Tanör, Osmanlı–Türk, pp.196–97. Tanör gives a nice account of how this organization used terrorizing tactics in order to control everything. The central committee of the party became the seed of an iron core in the whole Ottoman state – sometimes well hidden, and sometimes overt. Ibid., pp.202–7. Ibid., p.198. Fuat Keyman raises a somewhat similar point in his discussion on Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism, in line with other Third World nationalisms, possesses an inherent dilemma. The crux of the dilemma is that while it is fiercely anti-imperialist Turkish nationalism at the same time accepts the normative and epistemological dominance of the west as evident in the project of modernization/ westernization it embarked upon. For more information see, Fuat Keyman, ‘On the Relation between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey’, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol.13, Fall (1995), pp.93–120. A ‘securitization process’ can be considered as a process of security becoming the lens through which all issues are viewed. During such a process, an increasing primacy of security over all other issues can be seen. Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi [Turkey, A Modern History], 3rd edn. (Istanbul: İletişim, 1998), pp.233–4. Quoted in Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.264. Çavdar reports a speech by a constituent representative of the government, Recep Bey, who says that he carefully followed the opposition's speeches and noted that ‘not once did they mention the word Republic’. Ibid., p.264. Ibid., p.265. Ibid. Ibid. The chairman was Kazım Karabekir Paşa, deputy chairs were Dr Adnan and Rauf Bey, the General Secretary was Ali Fuat Paşa, and the board included Muhter Bey, İsmail Canpolat, Halis Turgut, A. Şükrü Bey, Necati Bey, Faik Bey, and Rüştü Paşa. Ahmet Yeşil, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası [Progressive Republican Party] (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2002), p.446. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.266. He reportedly said that he would not ‘shed blood unnecessarily’. Ibid., p.277. For a thoughtful analysis by an army officer of the rebellions made during the republican era, see Reşat Hallı, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar 1924–1938 [Rebellions in the Turkish Republic 1924–1938] (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1972). Yeşil, Terakkiperver, pp.404–27. For the negotiations over the decision to declare emergency law, see Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], vol.14, session 4, (25 Feb.1925), pp.306–9. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.276. Mustafa Kemal's responses to these telegrams were issued in the newspapers. Anadolu News Agency (Ankara), 26 Sep.1925. Ibid., p.277. For the three brief points made in this law, see Zafer Üskül, Siyaset ve Asker [Politics and the Army] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), p.88. These quotes of Feridun Fikri Bey, Hulusi Turgut Bey, and others, as well as further details of the liberal parliamentarians' arguments, can be found in Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923–1931 [The Establishment of One-Party Rule in the Turkish Republic 1923–1931] (Ankara: Cem Yayınevi, 1981), pp.142–3. This interpretation is also implied in Üskül, Siyaset ve Asker, p.82. These included ‘Tevhid-I Efkar’, ‘Son Telegraf’, ‘Istiklal’, ‘Sebilurreşat’, ‘Aydınlık’, ‘Sadayıhak’, ‘Sayha’, and ‘İstikbal.’ Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, pp.142–6. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.281. One example of this was the wide and arbitrary naming of suspects for an assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in June 1926. The law was then used to try, dismiss, and discredit many opposition figures. For details on the assassination attempt and its implications see Ergun Aybers, ‘İstiklal Mahkemeleri 1923–1927’ [‘War-time Tribunals 1923–1927’] (Ph.D. Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1979). A fascinating example of how the extraordinary tribunals acted virtually on behalf of the government is shown in the case of a private letter from a member of the East Revolution Court, in which he tells how diligently he is working to ‘punish the journalists in the area’. He ends the letter by asking for his ‘new orders’ and for the route that he should follow to do his job better. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi, p.282. Tunçay seems quite sure that Mustafa Kemal, with his well-known pragmatism, must have organized and supported the formation of the Free Party in order to make the potential societal opposition more focused, and therefore more visible and controllable. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, p.249. In a memoir by one of the leading figures in the Free Party, the author indicates that during the course of events, he and some other Free Party leaders were not really sure of Atatürk's true position in terms of his promotion of their party, and were concerned that they were just being used in order to explore the true trends within society. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları [Free Party Memoirs] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969). Ibid., p.64. Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], vol. 22, session 1, 1 Nov.1930, p.3. This atmosphere among the Turkish elite and, in particular, with Mustafa Kemal, was reported by the then American Ambassador to Turkey, J.C. Grew, Turbulent Era (Cambridge: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), p.869. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, pp.245–6. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka, p.8. Ibid., p.11. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, p.252. Fethi Okyar, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu Nasıl Feshedildi [How was the Free Republican Party Born and Dissolved] (Istanbul: n.p., 1987), p.443. Also see Furuzan Hüsrev Tökin, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler ve Siyasi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi 1839–1965 [Political Parties and the Development of Political Thought in Turkey 1839–1965] (Istanbul: Elif, 1965), pp.74–5. Son Posta (İstanbul), Yarın (İstanbul), and Halkın Sesi (İstanbul). Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, p 257. Fethi Okyar even reports that the father of a child, who was killed in clashes between Free Party supporters and government representatives, said to him that the dead child was his sacrifice to save the people from the current administration. Okyar, Serbest Cumhuriyet, p.448. Çetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı [Free Republican Party] (Istanbul: Özal Matbaası, 1982), p.111. İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar [Memoirs] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), pp.229–30. Tökin, Türkiye'de Siyasi, pp.74–5. Hilmi Uran, Hatıralarım [My Memoirs] (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), p.219. Fethi Okyar himself admits that, even to his own surprise, it appeared that the Free Party was getting overwhelming attention from society, and this panicked the ruling elite, since it threatened their status and power. Okyar, Serbest Cumhuriyet, pp.490–91. These deputies had formal and informal ties to the different executive branches of the state, for example to MPs who were on the Committee for Internal Ministry Supervision. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka, p.28. Tunçay, referring to Okyar, points out that the Free Party, in order to avoid the enmity of the state apparatus, guaranteed the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde, p 254. It is even reported that government agents tried to physically block the society from showing their support for the new party. Ibid., p.41. One leading CHP member, Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, accused the Free Party leadership of ‘betrayal to the motherland’. Ibid., p.45. Yunus Nadi, ‘Atatürk'e Açık Mektup’ [‘Open Letter to Atatürk’] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 9 September 1930. For Atatürk's response to this letter see, Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 10 Sep.1930. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka, pp.63–64. Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi [Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], Vol.22, session 1, (1 November 1930), pp.16–23. Milliyet (Istanbul), 5 Aug.1930. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka, p.77. It was reported at the time that at least one of Mustafa Kemal's closest friends said at a dinner party that if it were necessary, ‘they’ would even fight against Mustafa Kemal himself, in the name of the security of the republic. Ibid., p.71. These were more or less outlined by Fethi Bey during his famous Izmir visit, when he described European progress as the result of ‘a balanced combination of capital and labour in a very free competition’, free politics, a liberalism that ‘leaves people's issues to the people’, individual initiatives and a well-defined state role. Çavdar, Türkiyenin Demokrasi, p.300. These were religious circles that were opposed to the new secular reforms, and which sought to overthrow the secular administration and reinstate the Caliphate. Neşet Çağatay, Türkiye'de Gerici Eylemler: 1923ten Bu Yana [Regressive Activities in Turkey: From 1923 until Today] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1972), pp.33–34. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, 1859–1952 [Political Parties in Turkey, 1859–1952] (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952).