Abstract

In her comment on my piece in the latest issue of the American Journal of International Law (The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)? ), Mary Ellen O’Connell expresses strong objections to the piece’s central thesis, notably that small-scale or “targeted” forcible acts are not as such excluded from the scope of the prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter Article 2(4). What is more, she sees the central thesis and narrative of the piece as a mere veil, behind which hides the true aim of the article, notably to set forth an extensive reading of the right of self-defense—which was allegedly also the point of my book on armed attack of 2010. In other words, an argument pleading for a broad interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force is in reality used as a Trojan horse, to lure the unsuspecting reader into accepting a broader right of states to use force, doing considerable damage to the Charter regime on the use of force.

Highlights

  • Of Trojan Horses and Pandora’s Boxes. In her comment[1] on my piece[2] in the latest issue of the American Journal of International Law (The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?), Mary Ellen O’Connell expresses strong objections to the piece’s central thesis, notably that small-scale or “targeted” forcible acts are not as such excluded from the scope of the prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter Article 2(4)

  • The article is effectively concerned with the interpretation of UN Charter Article 2(4)— it is hard to deal with this topic without saying anything on the cases in which force can or cannot be used

  • My attention was drawn to the possible risks that come with excluding small-scale and targeted operations from UN Charter Article 2(4)

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Summary

Tom Ruys*

In her comment[1] on my piece[2] in the latest issue of the American Journal of International Law (The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?), Mary Ellen O’Connell expresses strong objections to the piece’s central thesis, notably that small-scale or “targeted” forcible acts are not as such excluded from the scope of the prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter Article 2(4) What is more, she sees the central thesis and narrative of the piece as a mere veil, behind which hides the true aim of the article, notably to set forth an extensive reading of the right of selfdefense—which was allegedly the point of my book[3] on armed attack of 2010. While O’Connell claims that my position is somehow aimed at expanding the right to resort to force in self-defense, it is perhaps rather her own position in support of a de minimis threshold that causes damage to the Charter regime on the use of force and, more generally, carries the risk of jeopardizing international peace and security

The de minimis threshold
AJIL UNBOUND
Conceptually Making Sense of Lawful Uses of Armed Force
Final Remark
Full Text
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