Abstract
Under the Energy Internet concept the distribution and management of resources in the electricity market have been gradually transiting from a centralized pattern to a decentralized pattern. Correspondingly, the methodological model for the analysis of economic behaviors needs to be upgraded too. Based on the idea of non-cooperative game theory, this paper puts forward a tripartite game model for electricity pricing in consideration of the power quality, which is applicable to the electricity market under the Energy Internet with distributed generation, including the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), generating companies (GENCOs) and the marketers which correspond to the regional power-retailing companies. Then, the sequential quadratic programming based on the quasi-Newton method is given to solve the game model. Finally, four sets of tests with different game factors are carried out to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. The SGCC price, the cost and the number of GENCOs and the cross-regional environment are considered in each test, respectively. The results show that this model can adapt well to the various conditions.
Highlights
Nowadays, environmental issues such as global fossil energy depletion and the contradiction between energy supply and demand are worsening day by day
In view of the complexity of the economic behaviors in the electricity market, it is necessary to carry on the research of advanced methods, such as the game theory which is derived from economics
The game theory deals with the problems when several players implement strategies according to their own conditions and the information they have in a certain constraint
Summary
Environmental issues such as global fossil energy depletion and the contradiction between energy supply and demand are worsening day by day. The first one is related to incomplete and imperfect information In this aspect, the equilibrium problem for the oligopoly electricity market, network constraint and power generation constraint are presented respectively in [12,13,14]. An n-person game model including the state grid corporation of China (SGCC), generating companies (GENCOs) and marketers (MKTs) is constructed. Based on the analysis above and the background of the electricity market in China, a tripartite game model taking SGCC, GENCOs and the MKTs as players is established in this paper, which is in consideration of the power quality. When SGCC and GENCOs set their pricing strategies, and MKTs bid their power demand on the previous day, the model can be applied to the day ahead market.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
