The Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Intellectual Property Protection with Government Participation

Abstract

As society continues to develop, intellectual property rights are becoming more and more important and play an important role in promoting economic development and other aspects. Intellectual property rights are not only important for enterprises, but also indispensable for the existence of government work. Based on the theoretical framework of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a three-party game model with the government, innovation subjects and stealers as the main players, analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategies of each participant, and conducts numerical simulations on this basis to further explore the key influencing factors of government administrative punishment, subsidies and the cost of innovation subjects in defending their rights. The results show that the three parties of the game reach strategic equilibrium when the innovative subject chooses to defend its rights, the government chooses to conduct strict regulation strategy, and the stealer chooses to conduct infringement behavior. For the influence of key factors, when the administrative penalties charged by the government for infringement increase and the subsidies to innovative subjects increase, it will lead to an increase in the probability of enterprises to defend their rights and a decrease in the probability of stealers to infringe; while the increase in the cost of innovative subjects suffering from infringement at the time of defense will lead to a decrease in the probability of innovative subjects to defend their rights and an increase in the probability of stealers to infringe.