The Trap of Neo-patrimonialism: Social Accountability and Good Governance in Cambodia

Abstract

In this article, we analyse the social accountability (SA) mechanisms that have recently been established in Cambodia. These initiatives take place in a socio-political context marked by pervasive neo-patrimonial structures. Our focus is on the “strategies” implemented by state actors, CSOs and ordinary citizens (mediated by neo-patrimonial structures) – strategies that demonstrate a “neo-patrimonial trap” into which SA initiatives have fallen, whereby official institutions and accountability lines have been undermined. These “strategies” are: to focus SA activities on local level authorities who have no means or power to introduce changes in governance or to improve public services, and to allow SA practices to emerge only to the extent that they do not threaten actual authoritarian distribution of power, norms and practices of clientelistic exchange, and the benefits obtained through patron-client relations. As a result, citizens have not been empowered to demand accountability but, paradoxically, have been encouraged to take over some government responsibilities. This, in turn, strengthens the networks of clientelism and patronage. These insights indicate the weak potential of externally-imposed SA mechanisms in an authoritarian and neo-patrimonial setting in which the government is only partly committed to achieving accountability. The findings are based on a two-year study conducted using a combination of qualitative sociological methods and an ethnographic approach.