Abstract

The Transformation of British Naval Strategy: Seapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808-1812, by James Davey. Forum Navale Book Series. Woodbridge and Rochester, The Boydell Press, 2012. ix, 237 pp. $99.00 US (cloth). Operations in the Baltic region have traditionally been ignored by historians despite its substantial contribution to naval supremacy during the Napoleonic Wars. The preponderance of written material on the maritime component of the war focuses principally on campaigns in the Mediterranean, the West Indies, and North America. Davey convincingly establishes that there has been a distinct lack in academic works which address the Baltic, in spite of the absolute significance of the region during the war. His seminal work compels readers to recognize the importance of the sweeping strategic and supply network changes during a transitional period in the Royal Navy, many of which originated in the Baltic. The book's historiography begins in the eighteenth century when a ship's time at sea was directly linked to the quantity of victuals stored on board. Ships were repeatedly forced back into port to replenish provisions, oftentimes while they were on critical operational duties. Davey maintains that limitations on provisioning directly impacted British naval strategy, particularly in areas where fresh victuals were difficult to acquire with any regularity, such as the Baltic. The author then turns his attention to the early nineteenth century, a time when the Royal Navy had begun the transition from ships regularly returning to port, to ships continually remaining at sea due to improvements in logistical networks. The transition was not necessarily an organic occurrence; instead, it resulted from years of bitter warfare between the two major European powers, Britain and France. Due to the longevity of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, both countries were compelled to streamline their outmoded traditions to make way for enhanced military efficiency. Improving British naval operations involved promoting and advancing changes to battle tactics, port blockading, and organizing convoys. While Davey remarks in his first two chapters that these particular improvements upgraded British maritime objectives, he also emphasizes naval limitations still existed, particularly with regards to the effectiveness in keeping the fleet continuously at sea. He argues that issues limiting a ship's time at sea emanated from the inefficiency in victualling ships afloat. His examination of naval victualling stems from his exhaustive doctoral research. He is therefore able to competently describe the extensive provisioning system under the direction of the navy's Victualling Board. According to his findings, strategic and logistical issues resulted not from the shortage of food, but rather from the navy's inability to efficiently distribute provisions. During the Napoleonic Wars, advancements in distribution meant that ships could remain afloat for longer periods, eventually eliminating the need for them to return to port for resupplying altogether. …

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