The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique

Abstract

The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of mineness, has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate the claim of an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Since the transcendental argument is depicted as the “central argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), I contend that, in view of its failure, the claim that all of my experiences have to be given to me as mine, all of your experiences have to be given to you as yours, etc., appears insufficiently substantiated. The idea that there is an essential connection between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness must be called into question.