The Transcendence of the Self in Light of the Hard Problem: A Response to Bas van Fraassen

Abstract

The Transcendence of the Self in Light of the Hard Problem:A Response to Bas van Fraassen Ted Peters Bas van Fraassen exists. But, he does not exist as one thing among other things. As a self he is not a physical object, not a mental substance, not an abstract entity, nor a compound thereof. I too exist as a self, in the same way Bas van Fraassen does. In fact, each of us who is a Self exists in a similar manner. It is language which uncovers and makes visible the human self. I refer to my self when I say "I," and you refer to your self when you say "I." Our language (langue) makes public self-reference in speech (parole) possible and understandable. With this in mind, van Fraasen winds his way through a forest of thoughts about language and ends up at this destination: "Since having language is a central and crucial aspect of what I am, it is literally and logically impossible for me to have a complete or fully adequate answer to the question 'What am I?' The I is transcendent in the strong sense that the I is not only never entirely captured by our representations in fact, but is beyond the very possibility of fully adequate representation."1 Although intended to protect the self from its assailants, I fear this defense is too weak. Yes, the self escapes being "captured" by language. Whew. Yet, can we say more about the self who escapes this capture? Yes, I believe we can. First, when speaking, what we say directs everyone's attention to the one who is speaking, to our self as a self. Second, our fundamental experience suggests the self comes prior. The self is not the product of language but [End Page 391] rather the one who is speaking. This observation, simple as it sounds, should strengthen van Fraasen's argument. I am concerned about the existence of the self just as van Fraasen is. I am concerned about protecting the existence of the intelligent human self with interior reflection. I am concerned about protecting the existence of the self with free will who considers alternatives, makes decisions, and takes action. I am concerned about protecting the existence of the self who determines things, who takes action that has an effect on the world's causal nexus.2 This self is under threat by those who would drop the self from existence into nonexistence. Neurocentrists who interpret brain science are rallying an army to attack the human self, to demand unconditional surrender of the self to the forces of physical brain activity. "There is no such thing as a self," contends philosopher Thomas Metzinger.3 Metzinger is not a scientist. He is a philosopher. Can the philosophical general muster scientific soldiers into his army to go to war against the self's existence? To my reading, van Fraassen has loaded the muskets on the rampart to defend the conscious human self from such an assault. I join van Fraassen on the rampart, but I fire with a different weapon. Here is my canon ball: although self is not a thing, nevertheless it is not nothing. Bas van Fraasen's phenomenological and philosophical exploration to find the self follows the trail of language, of narrative. He has fellow travelers among the neuroscience interpreters. "Do you really want to know who I am?" asks Jennifer Ouellette. "Let me tell you a story."4 I applaud this appeal to language and narrative for self-construction. Yet, the narrative approach to selfhood is insufficient. It must be complemented by a phenomenology of the self which reveals that it is the prior self who constructs the narrative of the self. It is the prior self who tells the story in which the self is the protagonist. It is not universal language (langue) but rather speech (parole) wherein the existence of the self becomes a temporal event within the larger linguistic history. In sum, the narrative self requires supplementation by the phenomenal self. If van Fraassen would add the phenomenal self to his linguistic or narrative self, [End Page 392] then he would solve the Hard Problem. What...