Abstract
This paper makes three major arguments: 1) US policy inconsistencies during the Iraq containment era alienated key European allies; 2) the allies really wanted the same outcome as the US in Iraq; and 3) the allies supported the US role as leader of the international system, but they envisioned a cooperative leader, not the unilateral actions of the Clinton and Bush (Jr) administrations. Thus, US policy inconsistencies are partially responsible for the lack of allied support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Three time periods are examined: the Gulf War (1990–91), the Clinton-led coalition that continued against Iraq under UN sanctions—prior to the invasion to oust Saddam Hussein (1991–2002), and events during the Bush administration which led to the 2003 takeover of Iraq. The paper concludes with lessons learned and implications for future of US–European relations.
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