Abstract

The article explores the role of cultural diplomacy in Weimar Germany and France's competing efforts to win the sympathies and support of the United States after the First World War. In the post-war United States, both France and Germany used cultural initiatives to pursue their opposing visions of the new international order: France to maintain and extend wartime cultural alliances beyond the armistice and implement the provisions of the peace treaty; Germany to overturn these very alliances and build a desirable transatlantic ‘friendship’ in line with its efforts to revise the Versailles Treaty. By focusing on the Franco–German rivalry for US affinities, the article calls attention to the transatlantic dynamics of interwar cultural diplomacy. It shows that the emergence of German cultural diplomacy was strongly shaped by French competition for the affections of politically isolationist Americans and that, in general, the rapid expansion of cultural diplomacy in interwar Europe arose from mutual feelings of crisis, starkly competing ambitions as well as the rapid circulation of ideas and practices.

Highlights

  • On 20 July 1923, at the very height of the Ruhr crisis, the German ambassador to Washington, Otto Wiedfeldt, sent home an alarming report on French propaganda activities in the United States

  • The article explores the role of cultural diplomacy in Weimar Germany and France’s competing efforts to win the sympathies and support of the United States after the First World War

  • By focusing on the Franco–German rivalry for US affinities, the article calls attention to the transatlantic dynamics of interwar cultural diplomacy. It shows that the emergence of German cultural diplomacy was strongly shaped by French competition for the affections of politically isolationist Americans and that, in general, the rapid expansion of cultural diplomacy in interwar Europe arose from mutual feelings of crisis, starkly competing ambitions as well as the rapid circulation of ideas and practices

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Summary

Introduction

On 20 July 1923, at the very height of the Ruhr crisis, the German ambassador to Washington, Otto Wiedfeldt, sent home an alarming report on French propaganda activities in the United States.

Results
Conclusion
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