Abstract

Following years of reduced cod stocks and the build up of capture capacity in the coastal fleet, the Norwegian government implemented “access closure” and “vessel quotas” at the end of the 1980s, in order to bring capture capacity under control. However, despite these rather powerful policy tools, the capacity of the Norwegian cod fishery continued to increase during the 1990s. This paper outlines the processes that led to this increase in capture capacity and to the accumulation of vessels in the large size segments of the coastal fleet, the exact opposite result of that intended by the introduction of the fisheries policy. We present two main factors to explain these trends: Firstly, the expansion in quota factors due to exchange or renewal of vessels. This provides vessel-owners with more “vessel-meters” which are equivalent to an increased share of total quota under the maximal quota regulations. This situation implies a redistribution of resources from smaller to larger vessels. Secondly, improved efficiency of technology aboard the vessels makes the vessels more efficient as capture machines. The effect of these changes remains hidden as long as the total stock increases, which was the situation from the introduction of the new regime and until the late 1990s. When the stock once again declined, the effect of the capacity build-up was exposed. A decade of soft choices, adjustments, and adaptations has used up the available solutions. New regulations and a new policy are now required.

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