Abstract

We analyze the tobacco industry’s “tort reform” campaign in Louisiana, which marked its first takeover of a state tort reform coalition, and interpret the strategies using the Policy Dystopia Model. We searched internal tobacco industry documents in the UCSF Truth Tobacco Industry Documents Library and searched news archives of state and local periodicals between 1985 and 2000. Using alliances, the tobacco industry clandestinely secured legislation in 1988 limiting manufacturer liability for inherently dangerous products. The industry took over a coalition in 1992 to defend its gains, minimize its publicly visible role, and pursue policies it likely could not directly advocate for after Louisiana’s government became more hostile to tort reform. The industry defended gains but failed to secure legislation eliminating liability for inherently dangerous products after its involvement was exposed. This case study expands the applicability of the Policy Dystopia Model. The industry passes laws harmful to the public interest by cloaking its involvement and motivations behind allies, front groups and generalized messaging. Exposing the industry’s role can help public health advocates protect against pro-industry legislation.

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